Natural languages can express some logical propositions that humans, with similar cultural traditions, are able to immediately and correctly compute. We illustrate this fact with a famous text that Arthur Conan Doyle attributed to Sherlock Holmes: the "old maxim" mentioned in "The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet", where Holmes said:
INTRODUCTION
The human brain is a spontaneous, pre-theoretical, computing device capable of performing sophisticated information processing, including mathematical and geometrical calculations. It is "pre-theoretical" in the sense that the human brains display many computational performances with no need of any explicitly programmed procedures or techniques. Clearly, language is used to express logical and mathematical computations whose cognitive bases still remain unexplained. We can ask if language acquisition involves a kind of implicit logical and mathematical programming that could explain such performances.
It is a common experience that the brain can solve problems concerning visual patterns without using any pre-existing mathematical knowledge. These problems are usually stated verbally and imagination built up mental figures. To illustrate this point, we can consider the following image representing a road.
If you ask adults in which zone, A or B, the road shows large curvature, the majority of the answers indicates point B. Of course, this conclusion is not based on the use of the classical mathematical formula the "old maxim" mentioned by the character in the story "The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet". We enunciate different versions of this "old maxim", and the reader can explore by himself the origin of the conviction these expressions usually provoke (see Doyle 1988 ). This maxim is a subtle logical statement and the interesting (and even astonishing) point is that the reader feels this maxim is an evident true. The problem we are trying to explain is the following: which is the cognitive reason for such a feeling?
We begin reproducing three of the most cited versions of Holmes' maxim, and then we describe a possible Bayesian approach to them, with its potentialities and its limitations.
In our attempt to provide a logical framework to Holmes' statements, we describe three levels of theorization that links Holmes' maxim with the modal logic of Aristotle, the symbolic methods and the algebraic logic developed by Boole, and the matrix algebra created by Cayley. The theories constructed by these three classical authors provide the "ABC" behind Holmes' old maxim (an unexpected lexicographic coincidence!) . These theories converge to a class of neural network model that using matrix algebra to represent associative memories, allow installing into these memories procedures able to execute many logical operations, including modalities.
HOLMES' OLD MAXIM
We now transcribe three well known versions of Holmes' maxim. Perhaps the most cited is the version presented in "The Adventure of the Beryl Coronet", where Holmes said:
"It is an old maxim of mine that when you have excluded the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth" (Beryl version).
Another version is in the novel "The Sign of Four" where Holmes said to Dr. Watson:
"How often I said to you that when you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth?" (Sign version).
The last version we want to reproduce here is included in "The Adventure of the BrucePartington Plans", where Holmes comments:
"We must fall back upon the old maxim that when all other contingencies fail, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth" (BP version).
Between the articles compiled by Eco and Sebeok (1983) there are many allusions to these texts, as well as some formalizations of the methods attributed by Conan Doyle to Holmes using techniques coming from mathematical logic.
AN ELEMENTARY BAYESIAN APPROACH
The involvement of probability in the three transcribed texts, invites us to approach the meaning of these statements using Bayes' theory. In this context, the probability
of i A as being the cause of event B is given by
where it is assumed that the set   
Consequently,
 whatever the a priori probability ) A ( P i . This deliberately simplified Bayesian approach gives us a possible explanation of the meaning of Holmes' maxim, but at the same time confronts us with the subtleties of any Bayesian theory.
First of all, the determination of a priori probabilities is usually not possible. In addition, usually is not possible the exhaustive enumeration of potential causal agents j A .
Nevertheless, we wish not to discard radically this approach because surely it is capable of providing useful intuitive hints.
It is important to remark that, together with allusions to probability, Holmes' maxim includes the words "impossible", "contingencies" and "truth". These three words point to a logical framework, and particularly "impossible" and "contingencies" lead us to the domain of modal logic. Consequently, we are going to assume that understanding our cognitive acceptation of the maxim requires beginning from logic, and a posteriori to include inside a logic frame any probabilistic argument. Moreover, we would to include this logic frame inside a neural model able to suggest why our biological brains are in fact the devices that accepts the validity of Holmes' maxim. With these purposes, we begin describing the clear statements established by Aristotle on modal logics. Then, we emphasize Boole's symbolic approach to mathematical problems with the use of abstract operators and, in particular, we mention his pioneer works of mathematical representation of logics. We also describe how this mathematical approach to logic allows mathematical representations for the modal operations. Finally, we show how 
where Pos represents the modal proposition "It is possible", Nec means "It is necessary", Not is the negation, and eq represents the logical equivalence. Q represents any proposition.
An equivalent representation is
Nec(Q) eq Not Pos (Not Q).
A corollary, based on the fact that the double negation corresponds to an affirmation, is Not Pos (Q) eq Nec (Not Q) .
Note that if Q is an arbitrary proposition, its negation Not Q can be interpreted as "whatever remains" once excluded Q. Hence, this corollary (5) Remark that the equivalences (3), (4) and (5) are true in all cases, notwithstanding the truth value of the modal evaluations of Q (i.e., both members of the equivalence can be false). The relation with Holmes' maxim restricts to the case in which both members of the equivalence are true.
This link with Aristotle's modal postulate is strongly important for the interpretation of Holmes' maxim, but it does not solve our problem. In fact, this fundamental modal postulate is a cognitive construction and shares with Holmes' postulate the enigma of the feeling of correctness it produces. Nevertheless, this is a fundamental link because it allows us to contact with the successfully efforts that transformed the Aristotelian modal postulate (3) into a mathematical theorem susceptible of being demonstrated.
THE ROAD FROM BOOLE
The contributions of George Boole were fundamental for the efforts to transform logic in a discipline susceptible of being supported by the techniques of mathematics. All along this paper, we are going to consider that mathematics models logic, and not to consider the deep and controversial problem of the foundations of mathematics. Our approach is pragmatic and heuristic, and here we consider mathematics as a construct able of modeling Nature. In this framework, the human brain and his products (e.g. logic, language) are part of the Nature. Obviously, if mathematical approach helps us to explain our cognitive acceptability of Holmes' maxim but mathematics itself (being a cognitive construction) remains unexplained, then, our eventual explanation can be considered incomplete and provisional.
Deeply influenced by the symbolic methods developed in the field of differential equations (his main area of expertise), Boole established the basic conditions that allow to map the logic truth-values on mathematical variables and to transform the logical statements in mathematical functions (Boole 1847 (Boole , 1854 . In addition, in his book "The Laws of Thought" (1854) Boole tried to link logical procedures with probability theory.
From this Boolean approach, it was possible to define functional relations for all the fundamental logical operations (e.g. negation, disjunction, conjunction, implication, exclusive-or, equivalence).
When logic is immersed into this "Boole Universe" (BU), the truth values define a set
where t and f are abstract (even arbitrary) mathematical objects corresponding respectively to truth-values "true" and "false". In this BU, the monadic functions Mon are applications Inside this LU, the classical modalities become monadic logical functions, and "possibility" and "necessity" can be expressed respectively by the functions pos (x) and nec (x), 3
x   , defined as follows:
The negation is defined in the LU as follows:
With this formal repertoire, we can represent Aristotle's postulate with a mathematical equation: 
We are going to assume the following axiom:
(for instance, the truth value of Q = "3 is an even number" is f and its negation is t; the truth value of Not Q = "3 is not an even number" is t).
Using this axiom, equation (7) can be written
If it is verified that Not pos [x(Q)] = t (9) the equations (7) or (6) We can accept that this model covers some logical aspects of the statement, but a more comprehensive modeling should include the following points: a) a connection with the neural structures that produce and decode Holmes' maxim, and b) a link with probability concepts.
These researches on symbolic operators, in many senses pre-figurate the matrix methods invented by Arthur Cayley, methods that we consider fundamental in the establishment of the contact between neural networks theory and formal logic.
THE ROAD FROM CAYLEY
When Cayley published "A Memoir on the Theory of Matrices" in 1858, at the same time he produced a fascinating mathematical object and a powerful instrument to represent natural phenomena. At the present time it is almost impossible to enumerate exhaustively the contributions of matrix theory to the physical, biological, and social sciences. Here, we particularly mention the importance of matrices in the development of the theory of neural associative memories, a theory developed mainly around 1970 (see Anderson 1972 , Kohonen 1972 ).
The matrix associative memories model important facts about biological memories established in many experimental and clinical investigations. Comprehensive descriptions of this theory are in included in Kohonen (1977) and Anderson (1995) .
These matrix memories are considered "distributed memories" because the residence of the information is a large set of synaptic contacts between neurons. This information is scattered and partitioned prior to be stored. This fact produces a desirable robustness of the model, in the sense that stored data can persist even in the presence damages that produce a loss of neurons or synapses; this robustness of the model is a desirable fact because biology had revealed the existence of that property in real memories.
This theory assumes that the cognitive patterns map on large dimensional vectors. A memory is a matrix that associates pair of column vectors ) f , g ( i i
, i = 1,2, …, K, where i f corresponds to the pattern i that enters the memory (e.g. the image of a dog), and i g is the associated output (e.g. a name associated with the input). As the theory shows, these vectors are composed by the electrochemical signals used by the neurons to code information; these signals are generated in parallel by thousands of firing axons (Anderson 1995) . The simplest form of the matrix that stores that pairs of vectors is as follows:
where the superindex T indicates transposition. Usually it is assumed that the set of stored input vectors is orthonormal (i.e. the i f are orthogonal between them and with length equal one). This assumption implies that the similarity between patterns is measured by the angle (equal patterns are parallel and completely different patterns are orthogonal). When a pattern k f enters the memory A, it is processed and generates and output. The following equation illustrates the mechanism:
13 where
 is the scalar product (an operation that directly produces the cosines of the angle between this multidimensional unitary vectors; this cosines measure the angle and, consequently, the similarity between the patterns). If the input pattern belongs to the set stored into the memory, i.e.
a perfect association.
To include semantic contexts in the framework of the theory of matrix memories, matrix memories involving a complex integration between inputs and contexts has been proposed. One of this proposal uses the Kronecker product to integrate inputs and contexts, and in this framework, the matrix memory can be expressed as
where  represents the Kronecker (or tensor) product, j p is the context associated with the input i f , and ij g is the output associated with the contextualized input (Mizraji 1989, Mizraji and Lin, 2011) . According to the algebraic rules involved in matrix algebra and Kronecker products (Graham 1981) , the response of matrix memory M in the presence of an input an its context is
with exact associations if the sets   If matrix memories (10) and (13) represent biological associative memory modules, they are usually rectangular matrices of large dimensionality. These large dimensional matrices tolerate a relative amount of destruction of their components without major deteriorations of their memory function (Anderson 1995) .
MATRIX ALGEBRA AND LOGIC
In the framework of the present work, an important result is that matrix memories (10) and (13) 
Important examples of Dyad(2) operators are matrix conjunction 2 C and disjunction 2 D , given by the expressions:
Using equation (14), derived from the theory of context-dependent associative memories, it can be easily proved that these operators execute vector versions of the classical operations. For instance,
The vector logic provides explicit expressions for some of the Mon(3) and Dyad(3) matrix operators. We mention the fact that, under this formalism, the modalities possibility and necessity become very simple monadic matrices (a consequence of Lukasiewicz functional definitions described in Section 4). Thus, for the three-valued vector system of logic, the identity 3 I , the negation 3 N , the possibility Pos and the necessity Nec, can be expressed by the following simple formulas:
where 2 I and 2 N are the operator given by equations (15) and (16).
NEURAL ARISTOTELIAN MODALITIES
Now, we can return to our problem of representing Holmes' maxim using at the same time formal logic representations, and a neural framework. First of all, inside this matrix formalism, the Aristotelian theorems can be expressed as vector-matrix equalities. For instance, the Aristotelian Postulate (equation (3)) and its algebraic version given by equation 2, can be expressed by the matrix equation
with Val(Q) representing the truth value that a neural system assigns to proposition Q,
. In addition, in this case, the rules of matrix calculus allow us to express Aristotle's theorem as a product between the matrix operators involved: ,
an identity not dependent of any particular value of the logical variable z (this identity can be checked using the previous miniature example).
The point of contact with Holmes' maxim is given by the matrix versions of equations (7) and (9):
We can adapt Axiom 4.1 to this context writing
Note that Q is not a vector-matrix variable and we cannot apply the matrix negation on it. Instead, Not Q is a proposition with a vector truth-valuation Val (Not Q). Under this condition, equation (27) can be restated as
This is a way to express that the impossibility of a proposition is equivalent to the necessity of the complement of that proposition. And this result establishes a close contact with Holmes' maxim. Here this maxim is represented using modal logical operators and truth-evaluations expressed with a formalism emerged from neural modeling. The logical operators involved in the equations of this section are interpretable as memory modules that integrate a modular network (in fact a network of networks, because each one of the logical modules is by itself a neural network). This modular network can be adapted to perform logical evaluations.
Obviously equation (29) implies an extremely simple fact: Val (Not Q) = s. As we mention previously, this seems a trivial conclusion, but it can be the result of a nontrivial process that was capable of eliminating uncertainty and of converging to this assertion. In fact, the valuation represented by Val(Q) (or Val(Not Q)) involves, in the neural context, a very complex cognitive process that only a trained mind can develop in order to diagnose the truth-value of a proposition.
Equation (29) help us to put the modal logical apparatus in terms of neural models, and to provide a new point of view to approach the spontaneous understanding that we feel when we are confronted with Holmes' old maxim. But this formalism does not consider any probabilistic evaluation of propositions, except the global assignment of uncertainties via the inclusion of a third truth-value. In the next Section, we are going to propose a heuristic procedure to connect the previous neural-logical approach with rough probabilistic evaluations of the propositions.
GUESSING PROBABILITIES FROM "NEURO-LOGIC"
To thought in terms of logical modalities seems to be a basic propensity of human mind. Many decisions happen in the presence of uncertainty. These decisions usually rely heavily on modal operations. Which decision is adopted out of a group of choices must take into account a set of ill-defined evaluations about possibilities. For instance, a gambler may say, 'I play roulette if I believe it is possible to win', and by gambling the risk taker intentionally ignores the mathematical odds against winning. Considering this propensity, it is natural that Holmes' maxim was embedded in its modal frame.
However, Conan Doyle enlarges and refines this frame including a subjective probabilistic evaluation: "whatever remains, however improbable". But probability is a well defined mathematical construct (see as Feller 1968 ) and strictly it is concept incompatible with any subjective evaluation. Nevertheless, we are continuously guessing probabilities, using a lot of accessible databases that help us to roughly estimate frequencies. This strictness of probability as a mathematical construct is one of the problems of the Bayesian explanation for Holmes' maxim sketched in Section 2, where the a priori probabilities involved seem to be no more that subjective guesses.
How to deal with such probabilistic guesses in a logical theory? Many theoretical approaches connecting logic and probability has been published (e.g. Boole 1854 , Keynes 1921 ) and these approaches have been connected with the problems of plausible reasoning (in particular by Polya 1990 ).
Here we are going to adopt the vector-logic formalism to establish a connection with cognitive estimated probabilities and the modal logic formalism inspired in neural models In the framework of this "neuro-logic", a way of introducing a probability guess in the logical formalism is to assign a numerical weight to the truth value of an uncertain proposition. For instance somebody can enunciate the proposition Q = "giving the clouds I am seeing, and the direction of the wind, I can forecast rain before the next two hours". Based on my experience (ie: screening the databases installed in my neural memories), I can establish that such a proposition has an 80 % of probability of being true. This assignment (obviously not a probabilistic measure but a conjecture) touches in some way probability theory because it implies that the complementary situation (no rain) has a conjectural probability of 20 %. In the framework of the vector formalism that procedure can be modeled assuming that
being s and n the vector truth values defined in Section 5.
Inside the post-Boolean, algebraic, logic the classical modalities can be defined by recursive processes based on disjunction ad conjunction (see Blanché 1968) . 
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In this formalism, the necessity is defined as follows. The proposition "Q is necessary", ) Q ( nec , can be represented using a concatenated conjunction  ,
or by the limit for   n of the recursive process
It is important to mention that this recursive process was implemented by McCulloch and Pitts (1943) using formal neurons capable of executing logical operations. Recently, this approach has been extended to neural modules sustaining distributed memories capable of computing the logical operations (Mizraji and Lin 2011) . Obviously, in the context of any neural model that pretends to describe a physical reality, recursions become finite. The formalism described in the previous section allows to represent these recursions using the conjunction and disjunction matrices (17) 
A version of equation (29) is given by
that give us another formal "neuro-logical" version of Holmes' maxim, but now with the possibility of establishing contact with subjective "probabilities" (obviously only pseudo-probabilities from the mathematical point of view).
Remark that in the scheme of this section, a research process implies the existence of a fact F that must be explained from a potential set of causes
. We can assume that a priori highly improbable causes do not belong to Q; consequently, they belong to the complement or negation of Q, that we represent symbolically by Not Q. Remark that the elements of the set Q are not necessarily unlinked nor exhaustive: a) they can be linked because if, for instance, 3 Q represents the name of a possible guilty of a crime (say Jean) then 7 Q (say Jacques) can be the name of the same criminal (Jean-Jacques) or the name of his associate, both corresponding to the searched cause; b) and they are not exhaustive because in general we may expect that
. The assumption here is that
Hence,
. This is the only assumption concerning probabilities. It implies the intuition of a kind of conservation inside the judgment (conservation mapped in the complementarity of assigned probabilities for the two canonical truthvalues s and n). In this work we will leave as an open problem the link between these "cognitive probabilities" and the formal probabilities involved in the Bayesian treatment illustrated in Section 2.
Using equation (40) we can now establish a modal-probabilistic version of Holmes' maxim. Let us rewrite this equation as follows:
with e being an event with a judged probability   constructed in order to formalize Aristotelian modal logic, using the Boolean theoretical framework. These matrix operators are simplified models of biological neural devices.
In the same context, vectors are the 'stuff cognitive decisions are made on', inside the neural realm.
The argument developed in this work suggests that we accept as true Holmes' maxim because our adult brains are equipped with neural modules able to perform modal logical computations. We say "adult brains" because our approach is neutral in the debate about the "Nature versus Nurture" origin of our logical abilities: these neural logical modules can be the result of a genetically coded ontogenetic process, or, on the contrary, they can be the result of a learning process occurring in a particular cultural environment (for a discussion of this point, see Mizraji and Lin 2001) . We argue that the spontaneous computation involved in the understanding of Holmes' maxim is only one example among many others; all of them emerged from a natural biological design that includes obviously our cognitive brains, together with our sensory and motor systems. In fact, language uses some computational codes that trigger complex cognitive procedures. For instance a preposition like "in" can induce the brain to represent a complex spatial relationship between an object and a container. In this sense, some logical words can also act as passwords that give access to sophisticated operations. For the neural theory, all these activities must be potentially modeled in terms of neuronal activities.
Implicitly, the present work is the defense of a method. In general, we can assume that cognitive activities can be considered as objective signals emerged from modular neural networks. If the advancement of scientific research arrives to refine an acceptable neural theory, we could establish a fascinating contact between the cultural life of humans and the biological sources of this culture. Many of our cognitive, and particularly linguistic, activities potentially allow to construct neural models capable of describing the facts acceptably, and susceptible of being confronted with the flux of data coming from neurosciences. Using these models, we should enlarge drastically our knowledge about the intrinsic limitations and potentialities of the human brain. It is well known that the understanding of our limitations is the classical precondition to enlarge our capacities via the design of appropriate technical instruments. Obviously these instruments can be material (e.g. microscope) or conceptual (e.g. mathematics).
On the other hand, the comprehension of our potentialities can promote the understanding of the complexities of our universe, and this understanding -as alwayswill be one of the basic enhancers of the cultural enterprise of mankind. Finally, let us comment that we assume that nowadays neural models are still emerging and preliminary, and that the method we mention is a promissory perspective for the near future. The work we present here is no more than a preliminary application of this method.
